As scientists, we are keenly aware that if putative causes perfectly co-vary, the 15 independent influence of neither can be discerned -a "no confounding" constraint on 16 inference, fundamental to philosophical and statistical perspectives on causation. 17 Intriguingly, a substantial behavioral literature suggests that naïve human reasoners, 18 adults and children, are tacitly sensitive to causal confounding. Here, a combination 19 of fMRI and cognitive computational modeling was used to investigate neural 20 substrates mediating such sensitivity. While being scanned, participants observed 21 and judged the influences of various putative causes with confounded or non-22 confounded, deterministic or stochastic, influences. During judgments requiring 23 generalization of causal knowledge from a feedback-based learning context to a 24 transfer probe, activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) was better 25 accounted for by a Bayesian causal model, sensitive to both confounding and 26 stochasticity, than a purely error-driven algorithm, sensitive only to stochasticity. 27
Introduction

33
Consider two scenarios involving a target cause, C, an alternative cause, A, and the 34 presence (+) or absence (-) of some effect. In the first scenario, the effect occurs 35 when C and A are presented in combination, but not when A is presented alone [A-, 36 AC+]. In the second scenario, the A-trials are removed, so that both C and A occur 37 only in combination with each other [AC+] . How would your judgment about the 38 influence of C differ across these two scenarios? Philosophers, scientists and 39 statisticians alike recognize that perfect co-variation of C and A in the second scenario 40 occludes the independent influences of each putative cause, rendering any judgment 41 about their respective effects fraught with uncertainty. Importantly, naïve human 42 reasoners also appear to, tacitly, apply this domain-general constraint on causal 43 induction, as evidenced by behavioral data showing sensitivity to confounding in a 44 wide range of causal and predictive judgments, by children as well as adults 45 (Spellman, 1996; Kushnir and Gopnik, 2005; Meder et al., 2006; Schulz and Bonawitz, 46 2007; Liljeholm, 2015) . Very little is known, however, about the 47 neural substrates mediating sensitivity to, and uncertainty associated with, causal 48 confounding. The current study aims to identify such neural computations. 49
A second source of uncertainty in causal and predictive inference, that has been 50 thoroughly investigated both behaviorally and neutrally, is the stochasticity, or 51 variance, of the outcome variable, which is greatest when the probability distribution 52 over possible outcome states is uniform. As with causal confounding, behavioral 53 sensitivity to outcome stochasticity is well established (e.g., Holt & Laury, 2002) . average of the absolute prediction error on previous trials involving that cue. Since 79 the frequency and size of prediction errors increases with unpredictability, this quantity 80 is proportional to the stochasticity of the outcome. Conversely, in Bayesian Causal 81
Models, uncertainty about the predictive strength of a cause is reflected in the entropy 82 of the posterior distribution over its possible strengths, which depends on the variance 83 of the effect variable, but also on the independent occurrence of alternative causes. 84
While both the associative and Bayesian causal model predicts sensitivity to 85 stochasticity, only the causal model accounts for uncertainty due to causal 86 confounding. Here, a combination of neuroimaging and cognitive modeling was used 87 to dissociate neural signals scaling with error-driven and causal uncertainty. In 88 particular, judgments requiring generalization of causal knowledge from a feedback-89 based learning context to a transfer probe were expected to elicit strong neural 90 responses to both stochasticity and confounding. 91
Materials & Methods
92
Participants. 20 healthy normal volunteers (mean age = 20.9 ± 2.4, range: 18-27, 12 93 females) participated in the study. A power analysis performed on data from a pilot 94 study on error-driven uncertainty, described in detail below, indicated that a sample 95 size of 16 would yield a power of 0.9 at a Gaussian random field theory corrected 96 threshold of 0.05 in regions of interest. One participant was excluded prior to any 97 analyses due to excessive head movement (> 6mm), leaving a sample size of 19. The 98 volunteers were pre-assessed to exclude those with a history of neurological or 99 psychiatric illness. All subjects gave informed consent and the study was approved by 100 the Institutional Review Board of the University of California, Irvine. 101
Task & procedure. Participants were scanned with functional MRI while performing a 102 causal induction task in which they assumed the role of a research scientist assessing 103 the influence of various allergy medicines on headache -a potential side effect. At 104 the beginning of the study, participants were instructed that each medicine could 105 either produce headache or have no influence on headache (i.e., there were no 106 preventive causes) and, further, that the influence of a given medicine might be 107 stochastic, so that even if that medicine was indeed a cause of headache, it may still 108 not produce headache every time it was administered. Three target medicines, C, D 109 and S, mnemonically labeled here to indicate "confounded", "deterministic" and 110 "stochastic" influences respectively, occurred only in combination with some 111 alternative medicine during feedback-based learning. Specifically, with +, -and ± 112 respectively indicating a 1.0, 0 and 0.5 probability of the effect, and with lower case 113 letters indicating non-target causes, there were 5 different types of medicine 114 treatments: e-, s'±, De+, Se± and Cc'+. None of the allergy patients had headache in 115 the absence of any medicine, which was explicitly stated in the initial instructions as 116 well as apparent on several "no medicine" (n-) trials. 117
Note that medicines C and c' both occurred only in combination with one another, so 118 that target medicine C was perfectly confounded with its compound counterpart. 119
Medicine D also occurred only in combination with another medicine, e, however, 120 "elemental" medicine e also occurred by itself, allowing for an estimation of the 121 independent causal influence of medicine D across the constant presence of e (i.e., across e-and De+ trials). Medicine S was identical to medicine D, except that the 123 probability of headache given the Se compound was 0.5 rather than 1.0; a 124 comparison of medicines S and D, therefore, identifies a difference between 125 deterministic and stochastic causation. Finally, medicine s' also produced headache 126 with a probability of 0.5 but unlike medicine S, never occurred in combination with 127 any other medicine, so that contrasting S with s' identifies differences due to 128 compound presentation. From a modeling perspective, an algorithm that relies 129 solely on outcome variance to track uncertainty would only respond to medicines S 130 and s'. In contrast, a computation that treats both confounding and stochasticity as 131 sources of uncertainty should generate an increased signal to medicine C as well as 132 S and s': These divergent predictions are respectively instantiated by the error-133 driven and Bayesian causal model specified in the subsequent section. 134
135
On each trial of feedback-based learning (see Figure 1A ), participants were 136 presented with an individual allergy patient and were told either that the patient had 137 not received any medicine or that a particular medicine, or combination of 138 Do you think he has a headache? Press 1 for "yes" or 2 for "no" medicines, had been administered. Medicines were color coded and labeled 139 accordingly (i.e., Medicine "B" was blue) with color assignments counterbalanced 140 across participants. On the first screen, the allergy patient's state was obscured by 141 a question mark and participants were asked to indicate whether or not the patient 142 had a headache, pressing the ''Y'' key for ''yes'' and the ''N'' key for ''no". After a 143 prediction was made, there was a brief (2000ms) pause during which the word "wait" 144 was displayed on the screen, followed by a screen revealing the allergy patient's 145 state (i.e., with or without headache). 146
Each of 6 distinct trial types was presented 8 times in each of 4 sessions, for a total 147 of 192 trials, with sessions separated by 2-minute breaks, during which the scanner 148 was turned off. Each session was further divided into 4, non-delineated, blocks, with 149 each type of trial occurring once in random order in each block. All trials were 150 separated by a jittered 4-second ITI. In every other block, each trial (except for n-151 trials) was followed by a query regarding the individual causal influence of the target 152 medicine present on that trial (i.e., C, D or S), or of medicine e or s' on non-target 153 trials. Specifically, participants were asked to choose between the following three 154 options regarding the relevant medicine: "is a cause of headache", "is not a cause 155 headache" and an ambivalent "may or may not be a cause of headache" ( Computational models. Two formal accounts of predictive strength and uncertainty 163 were implemented. First, an error-driven, associative learning algorithm updates 164 predictive strength, on each trial, using the difference between the observed state of 165 the outcome and the expected state based on all present cues: 166
where V is the predictive strength of a particular cue, c, ΣV i is the summed strength of 168 all cues present on trial n, and λ is the observed state of the outcome on that trial. The 169 associability of cue c on trial n, α c,n , is defined as: 170
where n-1 references to the previous trial involving cue c, and γ is a free parameter 172 accounting for the weighting of that previous trial relative to preceding ones. In 173 addition to scaling the influence of the prediction error on predictive strength, α is 174 taken to reflect current levels of uncertainty about the cue's influence (e.g., Esberg & 175
Haselgrove, 2011). The strengths and uncertainties associated with each cue were 176 initialized to 0.5. On feedback-based trials with target causes, which always occurred 177 in compound with an alternative cause, the α of the target cause (always greater than 178 or equal to that of its compound counterpart) was used to indicate uncertainty, while the summed strength, ΣV, was used to predict the outcome, and to compute the 180 prediction error. 181
A second formal account is provided by a Bayesian Causal Model, in which reasoners 182 make inferences over causal structures potentially responsible for the observed data 183 link to the effect exists for neither C nor A (G 0 ), C only (G 1 ), or both C and A (G 2 ). 187
188 Each graph has a set of parameters θ, which are strengths w i associated with causal 189 links in each graph (i.e., w B , w C and w A for links associated with B, C and A respectively 190 in G 2 ). Sequential estimates of these parameters were modeled, for each candidate 191 cause, using the smallest possible focal set (Cheng & Novick, 1992 ) -a set of events 192 across which alternative causes can be assumed to occur with the same probability in 193 the presence and absence of the relevant cause. Thus, estimates of the strength of 194 the "no medicine" background cause was modeled using only n-trials in G 0 . Estimates 195 of elemental (non-target) candidate causes s' and e were respectively modeled based 196 on trials with those causes and the "no medicine" trials (i.e., n-and s'± for candidate 197 which always occurred in compound with some alternative cause, estimation was 199 modeled given G 2 , using the trials relevant for the particular target cause (i.e., n-and 200
Cc' for target C; n-, e-and De+ for target D, and n-, e-and Se± for target S). 201
The likelihoods P(d|θ, G i ) were computed using a noisy-OR parameterization (Cheng, 202 1997) . Specifically, summarizing data d by contingencies N(e,c,a), the frequencies of 203 each combination of the presence versus absence of the effect, target cause and 204 alternative cause, the likelihood term for G 2 is: 205
(3) 206
where denotes the number of ways of picking k unordered outcomes from n 207 possibilities. N(c + ) indicates the frequency of events in which the target cause is 208 present, with analogous definitions for the other N(.) terms. The likelihood terms for G 0 209 and G 1 are similarly specified, where frequencies N(.) are summed across the 210 presence and absence of relevant events, and w i =0 for any cause that does not have 211 link to the effect in the relevant graph. 212
The marginal posterior distribution over strengths for a particular cause is obtained by 213 applying Bayes' rule, and integrating out the parameters for other causes in the graph, 214 such that, for G 2 , 215
where P(d|w B ,w C ,w A ,G 2 ) is the likelihood term, P(w B ,w C ,w A |G 2 ) refers to the prior 217 probabilities of causal strength parameters, and P(d) is the normalizing term, denoting 218 the probability of the observed data. 219
Uncertainty about the strength of a particular cause, the focus of the study, was 220 modeled as the Shannon entropy H(w c ) of its marginal posterior distribution P(w C |d): 221
(5) 222 
The model was sequentially implemented on a trial-by-trial basis, such that, for each 227 cause, likelihoods were computed on each trial of feedback-based learning that 228 yielded information relevant to that cause, using only the data point provided on that 229 trial, with the posterior on the previous trial being used as the prior to obtain the 230 posterior on the current trial. On the first trial in which data relevant to a particular 231 candidate cause was presented, the priors were assigned independent uniform 232 distributions. Finally, as an analog to the model-free prediction error, the Kullback-233 Leibler (KL) divergence between the prior (Q) and posterior (P) on each trial, 234 commonly referred to as "Bayesian surprise" (Itti & Baldi, 2006) was computed as: 235
As noted, target causes only occurred in compound with alternative causes during 237 feedback-based learning. On such trials, the entropy and KL divergence of the 238 marginal distribution for the target cause was used to indicate uncertainty and surprise 239 respectively, while predictions regarding the occurrence of the effect were generated 240 using a noisy-OR integration of causal strengths. 241
Both models assumed that, during feedback-based learning, participants selected 242 "Yes"/"No" responses to questions about whether headache would occur using 243 probabilities generated by a softmax distribution, in which a free noise parameter 244 controls the influence of predictive strength (i.e., the strength with which the 245 medicine(s) present on a given trail predicted headache; noisy-logical P(e|w i ) and ΣV 246 in causal and error-driven models respectively) on choice behavior. An additional 247 noise parameter controlled the influence of uncertainty (i.e., α and H(w c ) in error-248 driven and causal models respectively) on the proportion of ambivalent "May or may 249 not be a cause" judgments during queries about the individual influence of each 250 medicine. The first two instances of each trial type, and the first causal judgment for 251 each medicine, were excluded from model fitting to eliminate transient noise due to 252 task adjustment, and to minimize the influence of assumptions about priors. Free 253 parameters were fit to behavioral data by minimizing the negative log likelihood of observed responses for each individual and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 255 was used for model selection. 256
The model-derived probabilities of uncertain "May or may not be a cause" judgments 257 are plotted in Figure 3 for the causal and error-driven account of uncertainty 258 respectively. Note that, as was foreshadowed in the description of the study design, 259 the Bayesian causal model predicts high levels of uncertainty for both confounded, C, 260 and stochastic, S and s', causes, while the error-driven algorithm predicts that only 261 stochasticity will generate high levels of uncertainty. To address collinearity due to the shared prediction by causal and error-driven 278 accounts that uncertainty increases with increased stochasticity, the two algorithms 279 were analyzed using separate 1 st level General Linear Models (GLM), and were 280 directly contrasted at the group level using Bayesian Model Selection. Specifically, for 281 each participant, two GLMs were specified, one for the causal and one for the error-282 driven computational model. In each such GLM, three regressors respectively 283 To directly contrast error-driven and causal accounts, BMS analyses was performed 302 using a set of GLMs with the same onsets as those specified above, but with a single 303 parametric modulator (e.g., error-driven uncertainty at prediction screen onsets) 304 entered for each GLM. Thus, model comparisons isolated the relative contribution of 305 a particular computational variable to neural activity. First-level Bayesian estimation 306 procedure was used to compute a log-model evidence map for every subject and 307 each GLM and inferences at the group level were modeled by applying a random 308 effects approach (Rosa et al., 2010) at every voxel of the log evidence data. Group-level exceedance probability maps, reflecting the probability that one model is more 310 likely than the other, were thresholded to identify voxels in which the exceedance 311 probability was greater than 0.95. Classical inferences were then assessed using 312 BMS masks, within which a particular computational variable was more likely than its 313 competing counterpart, at an exceedance probability greater than 0.95: For example, 314 significant effects of error-driven uncertainty during the prediction period of feedback-315 based learning trials were reported only for those regions in which error-driven 316 uncertainty during this event period was more likely than causal uncertainty during the 317 same period, according to the BMS. against which to assess neural representations of uncertainty due to confounding, 323 also emerge in our causal learning task, a pilot study (n=10) was conducted that was 324 highly similar to that reported here, with the following exceptions: First, only 325 stochasticity, not confounding, was manipulated across putative causes, second, both 326 generative and preventive causal influences were included and, finally, judgments of 327 individual causal influences were solicited at the end of, rather than throughout, each 328 scanning session, and measured on a scale raging from -100 (strongly removes 329 headache) to +100 (strongly produces headache). The error-driven model of 330 uncertainty was implemented as described above, fit to behavior during feedback-331 based learning, and regressed against the BOLD data. A single region of interest (ROI) was constructed from the anterior insula and dorsal medial frontal cortex, using 333 the "Willard" functional parcellation atlas (Richiardi et al., 2015) . A power analysis 334 performed with NeuroPower (http://neuropowertools.org; Durnez et al., 2015) , using a 335 screening threshold of z=2.3, revealed that a sample size of 16 would yield a power of 336 0.9 to detect effects of error-driven predictive uncertainty in this ROI at a Gaussian 337 random field corrected alpha level of 0.05. 338 339
Results
340
Behavioral results 341
All statistical tests of behavioral data were planned comparisons, employing two-tailed 342 t-tests, and were calculated using n=19. Confidence intervals (CI) and effect sizes 343 Table 1 . Note that the proportion of ambivalent "May or may not be a cause" 346 judgments (3 rd row in Table 1 ) were greatest for the confounded cause (C), 347 intermediate, although still substantial, for the two stochastic causes (S and s'), and 348 virtually absent for deterministic causes (D and e), exactly as predicted by the causal, 349
but not the error-driven, model (cfr Figure 3 ; see Liljeholm, 2015 for similar results). 350
Note also that the distribution of "Is a cause" and "Is not a cause" judgments differed 351 markedly across stochastic and confounded causes, such that participants almost 352 never select the latter option for the confounded cause, consistent with the normative 353 increase in the likelihood that target cause C is causal given Cc+ trials, but distributed 354 their responses fairly evenly across these two options for stochastic causes, reflecting, 355 perhaps, the outcome on trials immediately preceding each judgment. 356
Planned comparisons revealed that the mean proportion of ambivalent causal 357 judgments were significantly lower for the deterministic (D) target cause than for both 358 
Neuroimaging results 382
All results reported below survived inclusive masking with voxels identified by 383 Grinband et al. (2006) found that activity in the DMPFC 456 scaled with the proximity of a stimulus to a category boundary. An important aspect of 457 this and other demonstrations of the involvement of the DMPFC in uncertainty is that 458 the level of uncertainty is directly related to the degree of experienced errors: that is, 459 the greater the uncertainty on a given trial, the more likely it is that the prediction on 460 that trial will be incorrect, as indicated by explicit feedback. In contrast, during 461 feedback-based learning in the current task, the outcome on confounded trials was 462 deterministic. Consequently, the increased activity in the DMPFC, as participants 463 generated judgments about confounded cause, cannot be attributed to a history of 464 errors. Instead, these results suggest that the DMPFC encodes a more abstract 465 representation of uncertainty, divorced from the immediate consequences of choice, 466 and irrespective of whether the specific source of uncertainty is confounding or 467 stochasticity. probabilities are completely unknown, with some finding greater activity in the DMPFC 472 in response to ambiguity than stochasticity (e.g., Hsu et al., 2005) . One might argue 473 that, in the current study, the influence of the confounded medicine is unknown, just 474 as the outcome probabilities of ambiguous gambles in previous studies were 475
unknown. But what does it mean to "know" something? Critically, all target medicines 476 occurred only in compound with alternative medicines during feedback-based 477 learning: consequently, when presented individually during causal queries, each was equally novel and, presumably, equally unknown. In other words, differences in 479 ambiguity between confounded and other target causes cannot be attributed to a 480 generalization decrement based on changes in stimulus features. Moreover, ambiguity 481 due to small samples and uncertainty due to confounding call for very different plans 482 of exploratory action: while in former case, repeated observation of the same stimulus 483 can resolve the uncertainty, the latter case requires an intervention that unconfounds 484 the stimulus configuration. Further work is needed to assess the overlap between 485 neural representations of confounding and ambiguity. 486
In addition to stochasticity and ambiguity, the DMPFC has been heavily implicated in 487 Table 1 respectively, 559 which clearly correspond to the increased uncertainty associated with confounded and 560 stochastic causes predicted by the causal model (cfr Figure 3) . It is worth noting that, 561 far from incidental, the failure of the error-driven account to predict sensitivity to 562 confounding is intrinsic to the model-free approach, due to its lack of a representation 563 of the independence of causal influences. Critically, a configural solution (e.g., 564 Pearce, 1987; 2002) , such that individually queried causes are treated as non-565 overlapping with the compounds in which they occur during feedback-based learning, 566 would fail to account for both behavioral and neural differences between confounded 567 and deterministic target causes, both of which occurred only in compound with 568 alternative causes during feedback-based learning. 569
While the effects of causal uncertainty in the DMPFC likely reflect sensitivity to causal 570 confounding, other neuroimaging results are clearly unrelated and, in some cases, 571 largely incidental to the specific model implementation. In particular, as can be seen 572
in Figures 6 and 7 , the ordinal mean values derived from causal and error-driven 573 accounts across trial types during feedback-based learning are identical for both 574 strength and surprise measures, suggesting that model-selection may reflect more 575 granular differences. For example, because of the Σ term in Equations 1 and 2 of the 576 error-driven account, the variance in the occurrence of the outcome across e-, De+ 577
and Se± trials results in a constantly fluctuating strength, and persistent prediction 578 errors, even on deterministic e-and De+, trials. In contrast, in the implementation of 579 the causal model, such non-conditional variance is eliminated by the use of a focal set 580 (e.g., Cheng & Novick, 1992; Spellman, 1996) . Behaviorally, the focal set assumption 581 is strongly supported by the lack of variability in judgments about non-target cause e. 582
This cause, which is paired with the outcome on half of trials in which it occurs, but 583 never when occurring in isolation, is almost exclusively judged to be non-causal, 584
suggesting that participants conditioned their inferences about its influence on trials 585 across which alternative causes could be assumed to be held constant. Nonetheless, 586 at the neural level, several regions may instead have been tracking the unconditional 587 outcome variance computed by the error-driven model. 588
As the mantra "covariation does not equal causation" implies, requirements for causal and may exist for neither C nor A (Graph 0 ), C only (Graph 1 ), or both C and A (Graph 2 ). 767 
